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merical reference may play a role in the emer-
gence of a fully formed conception of number.
The challenge now is to delineate that role.
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R E V I E W
The Role of the Medial Frontal Cortex
in Cognitive Control
K. Richard Ridderinkhof,1,2* Markus Ullsperger,3 Eveline A. Crone,4 Sander Nieuwenhuis5
Adaptive goal-directed behavior involves monitoring of ongoing actions and per-
formance outcomes, and subsequent adjustments of behavior and learning. We
evaluate new findings in cognitive neuroscience concerning cortical interactions that
subserve the recruitment and implementation of such cognitive control. A review of
primate and human studies, along with a meta-analysis of the human functional
neuroimaging literature, suggest that the detection of unfavorable outcomes, re-
sponse errors, response conflict, and decision uncertainty elicits largely overlapping
clusters of activation foci in an extensive part of the posterior medial frontal cortex
(pMFC). A direct link is delineated between activity in this area and subsequent
adjustments in performance. Emerging evidence points to functional interactions
between the pMFC and the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), so that monitoring-
related pMFC activity serves as a signal that engages regulatory processes in the
LPFC to implement performance adjustments.
Flexible goal-directed behavior requires an
adaptive cognitive control system for select-
ing contextually relevant information and for
organizing and optimizing information pro-
cessing. Such adaptive control is effortful,
and therefore it may not be efficient to main-
tain high levels of control at all times. Here
we review recent studies in cognitive neu-
roscience that have advanced our understand-
ing of how the brain determines and
communicates the need to recruit cognitive
control. Convergent evidence suggests that
the posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC)
and lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) are im-
portant contributors to cognitive control. Our
focus is on the role of the pMFC in per-
formance monitoring, especially in situa-
tions in which pMFC activity is followed
by performance adjustments. Evaluating the
adequacy and success of performance is
instrumental in determining and implement-
ing appropriate behavioral adjustments. For
instance, detection of a performance error
may be used to shift performance strategy to a
more conservative speed/accuracy balance.
Based on the evidence reviewed below, we
develop the tentative hypothesis that one
unified function of the pMFC is performance
monitoring in relation to anticipated rewards.
The monitored signals may index the failure
(errors or negative feedback) or reduced pro-
bability (conflicts or decision uncertainty) of
obtaining such rewards, and as such signal
the need for increased control.
Performance Monitoring
Flexible adjustments of behavior and
reward-based association learning require
the continuous assessment of ongoing actions
and the outcomes of these actions. The abil-
ity to monitor and compare actual perform-
ance with internal goals and standards is
critical for optimizing behavior. We first
review evidence from primate, electrophysi-
ological, and functional neuroimaging studies
that points toward the importance of pMFC
areas (Fig. 1A) in monitoring unfavorable
performance outcomes, response errors, and
response conflicts, respectively. These con-
ditions have in common that they signal that
goals may not be achieved or rewards may
not be obtained unless the level of cognitive
control is subsequently increased.
Although the pMFC can also be activated
by positive events (such as rewards) (1, 2),
we focus here on negative events and their
consequences. Because errors and conflicts
are intrinsically negative, and because unfa-
vorable outcomes are typically more conse-
quential for the regulation of cognitive
control than are favorable outcomes, our
review focuses on the role of the pMFC in
monitoring negative events.
Monitoring unfavorable outcomes. Elec-
trophysiological recordings in nonhuman
primates implicate the pMFC in monitoring
performance outcomes. Distinct neuron pop-
ulations in the pMFC, particularly in the
supplementary eye fields and the rostral
cingulate motor area (CMAr), are sensitive
to reward expectancy and reward delivery
(1, 3, 4). In addition, CMAr neurons exhibit
sensitivity to unexpected reductions in re-
ward (5). Likewise, specific groups of
neurons in the depth of the cingulate sulcus
(area 24c) react to response errors and to
unexpected omissions of rewards (5). These
findings are consistent with a role for these
neuronal populations in comparing expected
and actual outcomes.
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Human neuroimaging studies implicate
the pMFC, including the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), along with other
brain structures, in differential processing of
unfavorable outcomes (Fig. 1B). These
include studies using monetary rewards and
punishments (6) and studies using abstract
performance feedback (7). Similar parts of
the pMFC are activated by primary re-
inforcers such as pain affect and pleasant
tastes, suggesting that the pMFC plays a
general role in coding the motivational value
of external events.
Electrophysiological recordings in hu-
mans have identified the purported event-
related brain potential correlate of the pMFC
response to unfavorable outcomes: the
feedback-related error-related negativity (or
‘‘feedback ERN’’). This
negative-polarity volt-
age deflection peaks ap-
proximately 250 to 300
ms after a stimulus in-
dicating the outcome,




monetary losses than for
positive feedback and
monetary gains (8). The
timing of this brain po-
tential suggests that the
pMFC computes or has
access to a rapid evalua-
tion of the outcome stim-
ulus. Furthermore, initial
studies report that the
amplitude of the feedback
ERN shows a graded
sensitivity to the value of
outcome stimuli that is
normalized with respect
to the subjectively ex-
pected outcome value
(mean) and experienced




show that, in addition to
feedback-sensitive cells,







activation in response to
errors as compared to




activations cover a wide
range along the anterior-
posterior extent of the
pMFC, with particular
clustering in the rostral
cingulate zone (RCZ)
(12), the human homo-
log of the monkey’s
CMAr (Fig. 1B).
Consistent with these single-cell recordings
and brain imaging studies, electrophysiological
scalp recordings have found an error-sensitive
event-related brain potential localized to the
pMFC, which is attenuated in patients
with damage to the dorsal ACC (13). This
response-related ERN (or ‘‘response ERN’’)
develops at the time of the first incorrect
muscle activity and peaks about 100 ms later,
indicating that the underlying generator has
access to an efference copy of the initiated
incorrect response (14). The response ERN
is triggered by errors elicited under speeded
response conditions, independent of the re-
sponse effector (such as hands, feet, eyes, or
voice), and increases in amplitude with the
size or degree of error (15). Errors in these
tasks result predominantly from premature
responding, but continued stimulus process-
ing after the response can provide sufficient
information for outcome assessment. The
morphology, polarity, and scalp distribution
of the response ERN are similar to those of
the feedback ERN, suggesting that the two
ERN potentials may index a generic error-
processing system in the pMFC.
A recent theory has extended the notion
that the role of the dorsal ACC in coding
outcome- and error-related information may
be understood in terms of a common func-
tional and neurobiological mechanism (8).
The theory is predicated on prior research
indicating that errors in reward prediction are
coded by phasic changes in the activity of the
midbrain dopamine system: a phasic increase
when ongoing events are suddenly better than
expected, and a phasic decrease when ongoing
events are suddenly worse than expected (16).
The theory builds on this research by propos-
ing that these phasic dopamine signals are
conveyed to the RCZ, where the signals are
used to improve task performance in accord-
ance with the principles of reinforcement
learning. Furthermore, it proposes that the
phasic dopamine signals modulate the activ-
ity of motor neurons in the RCZ, which is
measurable at the scalp as changes in ERN
amplitude. Phasic decreases in dopamine ac-
tivity (indicating a negative reward predic-
tion error) are associated with large ERNs
and phasic increases (indicating a positive
reward prediction error) with small ERNs.
A strong prediction of this theory is that
the same region of the dorsal ACC should be
activated by response errors and unexpected
negative feedback. Also, during reward-
based action learning, neural activity in this
area should gradually propagate back from
the feedback to the action that comes to
predict the value of the feedback. These
predictions have been confirmed using neuro-
imaging, ERN measurements, and computa-
tional modeling (8, 17).
Monitoring response conflict. An alterna-
tive theory is that the pMFC, and in
Fig. 1. Areas in the medial frontal cortex involved in performance
monitoring. (A) Anatomical map of the medial frontal cortex. This is a
schematic map of anatomical areas in the human pMFC, based on
the atlas by Talairach and Tournoux (see supporting online material).
The numbers indicate Brodmann areas. The area shaded in red
encompasses the RCZ, and the area shaded in blue indicates the
caudal cingulate zone (CCZ), as suggested by Picard and Strick (11).
(B) Outcome of a meta-analysis of midline foci of activation reported
in 38 fMRI studies published between 1997 and 2004 investigating
brain activity associated with pre-response conflict, decision uncer-
tainty, response errors, and negative feedback (20). In the upper part
of the figure, the activation foci are superimposed on a saggital slice
of an anatomical MRI scan at x 0 4. In the lower part, the activation
foci are superimposed on the enlarged schematic area map. The
majority of activations cluster in the posterodorsal medial frontal
cortex, in the region where areas 8, 6, 32, and 24 border each other.
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particular the dorsal ACC, is involved in the
monitoring of response conflict (18). Re-
sponse conflict occurs when a task concur-
rently activates more than one response
tendency; for example, when the stimulus
primes a prepotent but incorrect response or
when the correct response is underdeter-
mined. Often, incorrect response tendencies
are overridden in time by the overt correct
response, resulting in high response conflict
before the correct response (pre-response
conflict). In contrast, occasional errors
resulting from premature responding are
characterized by response conflict after the
response: The correct response tendency
resulting from continued stimulus processing
conflicts with the already executed incorrect
response. In underdetermined responding
(that is, under conditions requiring choosing
from a set of responses, none of which is
more compelling than the others), decision
uncertainty occurs. Thus, decision uncertain-
ty involves conflict similar to response
conflict observed in tasks in which a
prepotent response is overridden (18).
The conflict-monitoring theory is consist-
ent with the neuroimaging evidence for
pMFC activation in response to errors,
reviewed above, and with the timing of the
response ERN, indicating post-response con-
flict. In addition, the theory predicts that the
pMFC should be active in correct trials
characterized by high pre-response conflict,
a prediction that has been confirmed by a
large number of studies (Fig. 1B). Moreover,
the predicted timing of such conflict-related
activity is consistent with the occurrence of
an ERN-like component, the N2, just before
the response (19). Finally, the detection of
high post-response conflict may be used as a
reliable basis for internal error detection,
thereby obviating the need for an explicit
error detection mechanism (19).
The theory further holds that, upon the
detection of response conflict, the pMFC
signals other brain structures that the level of
cognitive control needs to be increased.
Convergence and divergence in perform-
ance monitoring. The findings reviewed
above suggest that the detection of unfavor-
able outcomes, response errors, response
conflict, and decision uncertainty elicits
largely overlapping clusters of activation
foci in the pMFC. This assumption is
consistent with a meta-analysis of the human
neuroimaging literature (table S1), focusing
on pMFC activations in response to these
types of events (Fig. 1B) (20). The high
degree of overlap should not be taken,
however, as direct evidence for a generic
role of neurons (or neuronal populations) in
this brain area in monitoring various aspects
of performance. First, although there is
considerable overlap, there are some appar-
ent differences as well, with foci associated
with pre-response conflict clustering slightly
more dorsally than foci activated during
error and feedback monitoring (21, 22).
Second, single-cell recordings in monkeys
suggest that different (neighboring) neurons
within specific pMFC regions can be in-
volved in different aspects of performance
monitoring (4). Thus, the overlap between
the activation foci identified in human
neuroimaging studies does not necessarily
imply identical functions for all neurons or
neuronal ensembles within the pMFC.
A potential link between the outlined
theories of pMFC functions is that pre-
response conflict and decision uncertainty
signal a reduced probability of obtaining
reward, whereas errors and unexpected
negative feedback signal the loss of antici-
pated reward. The pMFC, particularly the
RCZ, is engaged when the need for adjust-
ments to achieve action goals becomes
evident. Interestingly, the monitoring pro-
cesses examined here cluster primarily in the
transition zone between the cingulate and
paracingulate (areas 24 and 32), association
(area 8), and premotor cortices (area 6), an
area that has extensive connections with
brain areas involved in the control of
cognitive and motor processes and has been
implicated in the regulation of autonomic
arousal (23, 24). This presumably places the
pMFC in a strategically located position for
signaling the need for performance adjust-
ments and for interacting with brain areas
involved in motor and cognitive, as well as
autonomic and motivational, functions.
Performance Adjustments
Although the pMFC is consistently impli-
cated in action monitoring, the mechanisms
underlying the implementation of subsequent
performance adjustments are less well un-
derstood. Two important questions are: (i) Is
there a link between pMFC activation
associated with performance monitoring and
subsequent performance adjustments? (ii)
What brain structures may be involved in
the implementation of such control adjust-
ments? In neuroimaging and neuropsycho-
logical studies, the LPFC has been broadly
implicated in the coordination of adaptive
goal-directed behavior (25–29). We review
studies that address the first question, and
we briefly evaluate the scant literature on
functional interactions between the pMFC
and LPFC in the service of adaptive control.
pMFC activity and immediate control
adjustments. When stimuli elicit conflicting
response tendencies or overt response errors,
appropriate performance adjustments may be
aimed not only at immediate correction of
these tendencies but also at preventing errors
on subsequent trials. A distinction can be
made between two types of trial-to-trial
performance adjustments: (i) shifts in the
tradeoff between speed and accuracy of
responding that place the cognitive system
in a more cautious (as opposed to impulsive)
response mode, and (ii) increases in control
that improve the efficiency of information
processing. Speed/accuracy tradeoffs may be
expressed in ‘‘post-error slowing,’’ the ob-
servation that reaction times typically slow
down after errors and correct, high-conflict
trials (18). Changes in control, induced by
such trials, can become evident in improved
performance due to reduced interference
from distracting information. For example,
the increase in reaction times normally
observed for incongruent stimuli (where
target and distractor stimuli call for opposing
responses) as compared to congruent stimuli
(when distractors elicit the same action as
the target stimulus) is typically reduced on
trials after errors (30).
Several observations are consistent with a
close link between modulations of pMFC
activity and subsequent changes in perform-
ance. One study categorized trials in terms of
their ERN amplitudes and found that the
reaction time on the subsequent trial slowed
progressively with increasing ERN ampli-
tude on the current trial (14). In a similar
vein, response errors on a two-alternative
forced-choice task are foreshadowed by
modulation of this pMFC activity during
the immediately preceding (correct) re-
sponse. Error-preceding trials were charac-
terized by increased positivity in the time
window typically associated with the ERN
(31). This ‘‘error-preceding positivity’’ may
reflect a transient disengagement of the
monitoring system, resulting in occasional
failures to implement appropriate control
adjustments and hence in errors. Experimen-
tal factors that affect ERN amplitude may
also affect subsequent performance adjust-
ments. For example, alcohol consumption
led to a reduction in the ERN amplitude and
eliminated the post-error reduction of inter-
ference observed in a control condition (30).
The relation between these findings and the
associated neural circuitry was captured
more directly in recent neuroimaging studies
of Stroop task and response-inhibition per-
formance (32, 33): Post-hoc reaction time
analyses revealed that greater ACC activity
during error trials was associated with
greater post-error slowing.
The latter studies also addressed the role
of the LPFC in implementing control adjust-
ments and its interaction with the pMFC.
Trials exhibiting the greatest behavioral
adjustments after errors and correct, high-
conflict trials were associated with increased
activity in the LPFC. Further, the degree of
pMFC activity on conflict and error trials
accurately predicted activity in the LPFC on
the next trial. These and other findings are
consistent with the idea that the pMFC, as a
C O G N I T I O N A N D B E H A V I O R












































monitor, and the LPFC, as a controller,
interact in the regulation of goal-directed
behavior (18).
pMFC activity and reward-based associ-
ation learning. In addition to the link
between pMFC activity and immediate
adjustments in performance, there also seems
to be a close relation between pMFC activity
and reward-based association learning. A
study of reward-based reversal learning in
monkeys identified cells in the CMAr that
fired only when two conditions were met: (i)
reward was less than anticipated, and (ii) the
reduction in reward was followed by changes
in the monkeys’ action selection (5). This
finding has been corroborated by two recent
functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies of reversal learning, showing
that ACC activity was observed under the
same conjunctive condition (34, 35). Rever-
sal learning studies typically also show
activation of the LPFC and other structures
in association with changes in choice behav-
ior (36). Whether these behavioral adjust-
ments are implemented by or pMFC or
whether the pMFC merely signals the LPFC
or other structures to implement the adjust-
ments remains to be explored.
Finally, there is evidence for an intimate
relation between ERN amplitude and associa-
tive learning. In scalp electrophysiological
activity, recorded from human participants
who were required to learn stimulus-response
contingencies on the basis of trial-to-trial
positive or negative feedback, the feedback
ERN to negative feedback decreased as par-
ticipants were learning the contingencies,
which is consistent with the theory dis-
cussed above that the ERN reflects a reward
prediction error signal (8). Also, as partici-
pants learned the response associated with
each stimulus, the response ERN associated
with choice errors (provoked through the
use of a stringent reaction time deadline)
increased. In a temporal difference-learning
model, not only did the ERN correlate with a
reward prediction error but the brain activity
underlying the ERN could also serve as a
reinforcement learning signal for associative
learning and hence optimizing task perform-
ance (8).
Conclusions and Future Directions
We have provided an overview of the
evidence suggesting a critical role for the
pMFC in performance monitoring and the
implementation of associated adjustments in
cognitive control. Our meta-analysis indi-
cates that an extensive part of the pMFC—
including areas 6, 8, 24, and 32, largely
falling into a region referred to as the RCZ in
humans—is consistently activated after the
detection of response conflict, errors, and
unfavorable outcomes. The similarities be-
tween two brain potentials generated by this
area, the ERN and feedback ERN, are
consistent with the view that the pMFC
accommodates a unified functional and
neurobiological performance-monitoring
mechanism (8). This mechanism allows the
pMFC to signal the likelihood of obtaining
an anticipated reward (either definitive, as
observed in studies of error detection and
feedback processing, or probabilistic, as
observed in studies of decision uncertainty
and pre-response conflict).
Three conclusions from the meta-analysis
should be emphasized. First, performance
monitoring is associated with pMFC activa-
tions in a functionally integrated region (the
RCZ) that cuts across various Brodmann
areas beyond the ‘‘traditionally’’ reported
ACC. Second, the most pronounced cluster
of activations is in area 32 for all types of
monitored events, suggesting the importance
of this area for a unified performance
monitoring function. Thus, the conclusion
that error monitoring and conflict monitoring
are performed by different areas, as derived
from initial studies that were designed to
identify differential involvement, is not ubiq-
uitously confirmed by the meta-analysis.
Third, activations related to pre-response
conflict and uncertainty occur more often in
area 8 and less often in area 24 than do
activations associated with errors and neg-
ative feedback. Thus, although there is
considerable overlap, there are some appar-
ent differences as well, with activation foci
associated with reduced probabilities of
obtaining reward clustering slightly more
dorsally than foci associated with errors and
failures to obtain anticipated reward.
This generic monitoring function endows
the pMFC with the capacity to signal the need
for performance adjustment. Indeed, further
evidence indicates a tight link between activ-
ity in this area and subsequent adjustments in
performance, suggesting that the pMFC sig-
nals other brain regions that changes in cog-
nitive control are needed. Although direct
evidence is sparse, a likely candidate structure
for effecting these control adjustments is the
LPFC. Thus, monitoring-related pMFC activ-
ity may serve as a signal that engages con-
trol processes in the LPFC that are needed
to regulate task performance in an adaptive
fashion.
This conclusion notwithstanding, several
questions remain. First, most studies of the
pMFC and performance monitoring have
tried to relate pMFC activity to control
adjustments on the subsequent trial. An
unresolved issue is whether the monitoring
signal from the pMFC can also be used to
resolve response conflicts on a within-trial
basis (34). There is in principle no reason
why such adjustments could not be imple-
mented already within the same trial (to
resolve conflict and correct the activation of
inappropriate responses before they eventu-
ate in an overt error). It is hard to tackle this
question empirically using neuroimaging
studies, because it requires disentangling
the monitoring signal (indicating the need
for control) and the answer to this signal
(control implementation), which may be
partly overlapping in time.
Another unresolved issue concerns the
nature of the connection between the pMFC
and LPFC. Anatomical studies in monkeys
show dense reciprocal connections of the
pMFC and LPFC (37, 38). In humans,
evidence for such connections is more
indirect. Neuroimaging studies show con-
comitant activations in the LPFC and pMFC
(39), suggesting close functional connectiv-
ity between these two areas. Little is known,
however, about differential or selective
reciprocal projections between various por-
tions of the pMFC on the one hand and
various subdivisions of the LPFC on the
other. Possibly, this functional interplay is in
part mediated by subcortical structures such
as the basal ganglia and mesencephalic
nuclei (7, 8) or by the supplementary motor
area (SMA) or pre-SMA (29, 40).
Electrophysiological studies of patients
with LPFC lesions have reported abnormal
pMFC activity in response to errors (41).
Such studies argue against the possibility of
unidirectional information flow between the
pMFC and LPFC, and instead suggest that
performance monitoring and the regulation
of cognitive control may be realized through
intricate reciprocal projections between these
two structures. It is a challenge for future
research to further identify and characterize
these interactions.
Although our review of the literature
capitalizes on the role of the pMFC in
performance monitoring, leading to perform-
ance adjustments on subsequent trials, other
studies have suggested a more executive role
for the pMFC in implementing control directly
(42). Studies in nonhuman primates have
shown that cells in the pMFC (especially in
the monkey homolog of the RCZ) are well
situated for this role, because this area has
direct and indirect projections to primary and
supplementary motor areas (43, 44). It has
been argued that some of these cells are
involved in ‘‘goal-based action selection’’
(that is, selecting between competing actions
in view of the anticipated reward associated
with each of these actions) (43, 44). The
relation between these complementary func-
tions remains to be further explored.
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R E V I E W
Neuroeconomics: The Consilience of
Brain and Decision
Paul W. Glimcher1* and Aldo Rustichini2
Economics, psychology, and neuroscience are converging today into a single, unified
discipline with the ultimate aim of providing a single, general theory of human
behavior. This is the emerging field of neuroeconomics in which consilience, the
accordance of two or more inductions drawn from different groups of phenomena,
seems to be operating. Economists and psychologists are providing rich conceptual
tools for understanding and modeling behavior, while neurobiologists provide tools
for the study of mechanism. The goal of this discipline is thus to understand the
processes that connect sensation and action by revealing the neurobiological
mechanisms by which decisions are made. This review describes recent develop-
ments in neuroeconomics from both behavioral and biological perspectives.
The full understanding of utility will
come from biology and psychology by
reduction to the elements of human
behavior followed by a bottom-up
synthesis, not from the social sciences
by top-down inference and guesswork
based on intuitive knowledge. It is in
biology and psychology that econo-
mists and social scientists will find the
premises needed to fashion more
predictive models, just as it was in
physics and chemistry that research-
ers found the premises that upgraded
biology. (p. 206) (1)
Consider the famous St. Petersburg para-
dox (2). Which of the following would you
prefer, /40 or a lottery ticket that pays
according to the outcomes of one or more
fair coin tosses: heads you get /2 and the
game ends, tails you get another toss and the
game repeats, but now if the second toss
lands heads up you get /4, and so on. If the
nth toss is the first to land heads up, you get
2n dollars. The game continues, however
long it takes, until the coin lands heads up.
We can assess the average objective, or
expected, value of this lottery by multiplying
the probability of a win on each flip by the
amount of that win:
Expected value 0 ð0:5  2Þ þ ð0:25  4Þ þ
ð0:125  8ÞI
0 1 þ 1 þ 1 þ I
This simple calculation reveals that the
expected value of the lottery is infinite even
though the average person is willing to pay
less than /40 to play it. How could this be?
For an economist, any useful explanation
must begin with a set of assumptions that
renders behavior formally tractable to coher-
ent theoretical and mathematical analysis.
Economists therefore explain this behavior
by assuming that the desirability of money
does not increase linearly, but rather grows
more and more slowly as the total amount at
stake increases. For example, the desirability
of a given amount might be a power function
1Center for Neural Science, New York University,
New York, NY 10003, USA. 2Department of Econom-
ics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455,
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